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1 
1.1 Thesis Statement and Research Questions 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the justification of amnesty for human rights violations, 
and further to discuss whether these arguments are justifiable from a transitional justice 
perspective. I will use these discussions to explore Law 975, as an example of a law where 
amnesty is included.  
1.1.1 Thesis Statement 
It is argued that amnesties adopted in a transitional context are usually considered a direct 
hinder to transitional justice, especially to criminal trials, but also to truth and 
compensation mechanisms.1 Yet the paradox is that an amnesty may also form an 
integrated element of transitional justice mechanism, for example by incorporation in a 
truth-commissions mandate.2
1.1.2 Research Questions 
 The purpose of this study is to explore this paradox by 
analyzing the arguments for and against amnesties, and the relationship between amnesty 
and transitional justice. Thus, the research questions are:  
a) What are the arguments for and against amnesty? 
b) Do transitional justice perspectives allow for amnesty for past human rights 
violations to be justified?  
c) Is the inclusion of amnesty in Colombia’s ‘Justice and Peace Law’ (Law 975) 
justifiable from a Transitional Justice perspective? 
                                                 
1 Freeman (2009): p.19. 
2 Ibid. p.19. 
 2 
1.2 Justification and Objectives of the Study 
The idea that the normative nature of human rights standards may complicate the practical demands of 
peacemaking has been a recurrent theme in discussions on the relationship between human rights and efforts 
to address violent conflict. 3
 
 
This statement by Michelle Parlevliet describes a phenomenon that is widely debated 
around the world when political transitions are discussed. When a country goes from a state 
of conflict to a state of non-conflict, the question arises of how much justice it is necessary 
to sacrifice in order to achieve peace. Should abusers of former human rights violations 
gain amnesty in order to end the conflict? International Center for Transitional Justice 
expresses in a press release that “countries that undermine justice in the name of stability, 
risk creating greater instability”.4 From this perspective, could there be peace without 
securing justice? Louise Mallinder argues that amnesty from criminal prosecutions may 
impact positively upon reconciliation provided that they are accompanied by other 
transitional justice mechanisms and institutional reforms.5 Others again hold that the 
granting of an amnesty from criminal justice could be seen as the committing of an 
injustice in order to achieve desirable consequences.6
1.2.1 Amnesty in the debate of ‘Peace vs. Justice’ 
 Can the committing of an unjust act 
to the victims of a conflict be justified if it prevents future injustices? Or, from the other 
point of view; does the violation of a right give us the right to violate that person’s rights 
by punishing him or her? These questions together with opposing views on the issue led me 
to the research questions listed above. I hope the thesis will contribute with some 
interesting views that are relevant to the development of this discussion. I will now present 
three arguments for why this study is interesting and relevant: 
The first objective of this study is to explore the aspect of amnesty for human rights 
violations. The debate of ‘peace vs. justice’ has been widely discussed for many years7
                                                 
3 Parlevliet (2009): p.2  
 and 
4 International Center for Transitional Justice, press release (2006).  
5 Mallinder (2008): p.18.  
6 Greenawalt (2000): p.191.  
7 Sriram (2004), Andreassen and Skaar (1998), Rangel Suárz (2009).  
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two conflicting views have emerged; that there is no peace without justice and that justice 
is necessary to achieve peace; and, on the other hand, that it is necessary to sacrifice some 
justice to achieve the overall goal of peace. Recent literature on the topic shows more 
nuanced and less divided approaches, where one starts to see the development of theories 
that contains aspects from both ‘sides’ of the debate. The former Secretary-General of the 
UN, Kofi Annan, states:  
We should know that there cannot be real peace without justice, yet the relentless pursuit of justice may 
sometimes be an obstacle to peace. If we insist, at all times and in all places, on punishing those who are 
guilty of extreme violations of human rights, it may be difficult or even impossible to stop the bloodshed 
and save innocent civilians. If we always and everywhere insist on uncompromising standards of justice, 
a delicate peace may not survive. But equally, if we ignore the demands of justice simply to secure 
agreement, the foundations of that agreement will be fragile, and we will set bad precedents.8
This statement exemplifies the ongoing debate of ‘peace’ and ‘justice’ in the aftermath of 
widespread atrocities. One aspect that is still controversial in the peace vs. justice divide is 
the question of amnesty; should perpetrators for former human rights violations be put on 
trial or could amnesty laws better contribute to peace and reconciliation? There are two 
main reasons why I have chosen to focus on the aspect of amnesty in the debate of ‘peace 
vs. justice’: 
  
I. The Controversial Nature of Amnesty  
Amnesty is, as Ronald Slye puts it; “one of the most controversial mechanisms 
contemporary societies have used to address violent pasts”.9 We are in a stage of the anti-
impunity struggle where the amnesty bar is higher than it has even been.10 Still, states are 
continuing to rely on amnesties when confronted by conflict despite the growth of the 
human rights movement and international criminal justice.11
                                                 
8 UN Doc. S/PV.4833 (2003): p.3.  
 Circumstances leading to the 
invocation of amnesties still abound and will continue to do so as long as there are rebels 
negotiating the laying down of arms or repressive leaders negotiating the terms of their 
9 Slye (2000): p.170.  
10 Freeman (2009): p.3. 
11 Mallinder (2008): p.29.  
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departure.12 As Freeman points out; because of this controversy it is difficult to defend 
amnesty, especially after World War II when the human rights regime was established.13
II. The Oversimplification of Amnesty 
 
However, my opinion is that even if the subject is controversial, and maybe even because 
of that, it is important to discuss.  
The subject of amnesty has too often been distorted through oversimplification,14
The debate of whether to grant blanket amnesty or to secure accountability through 
criminal prosecutions are the two extremes which by some is understood as a discussion of 
impunity vs. criminal accountability, rather than taking into account the diversity of 
amnesty laws and the variation of accountability measures. One understanding is that 
“amnesties represent Faustian pacts with the ‘devil’ in the forms of torturers and murderers, 
where rights such as truth and justice are scarified for political stability”.
 and tends 
to be seen as a tool for gaining impunity for former human rights crimes, and a practice that 
violates the rights of the victims.  
15
However, there are many grey zones between the two extremes and the views are many 
with regards to the legitimacy of amnesty laws for human rights violations. This study will 
argue for the need for a more nuanced account of amnesties, combined with transitional 
justice mechanisms. As Freeman states; “Amnesty is an issue that will not go away. The 
question is what one can do about it to limit the concessions to impunity”.
 This is an 
example of the supposedly contradictory goals of peace and justice, and between amnesty 
and accountability.  
16
1.2.2 The Use of the Transitional Justice Perspective 
 
The second objective of this study is to discuss the aspect of amnesty for human rights 
violations from a transitional justice perspective. As noted in the former section, amnesty 
                                                 
12 Freeman (2009) :p.4 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. p.12. 
15 Mallinder (2008): p.1-2.  
16 Freeman (2009): p.31.  
 5 
often becomes a part of an ‘either – or’ discussion; either impunity through amnesty, or 
accountability through criminal prosecutions. Two views that represent this divide on how 
to confront crimes have emerged; Retributive justice which emphasizes criminal 
prosecutions; and Restorative justice which emphasizes more alternative accountability 
measures. Yet, the field of transitional justice has highlighted that there is actually a broad 
spectrum of choices available to respond to past human rights violations.17
It is possible to say that transitional justice contains elements of both Retributive and 
Restorative justice. These views, especially the Restorative model, have traditionally been 
used in discussions related to less serious crimes, but in recent years they have gained more 
attention also with regards to human rights violations. Transitional justice, however, 
specifically deals with how to confront human rights violations. Interpreting amnesty from 
a transitional justice perspective would therefore give a comprehensive approach to a 
situation where serious human rights violations have occurred.  
  
Another interesting aspect of using a transitional justice approach is that it is linked to 
traditional conflict resolution approaches. In some literature the term conflict resolution 
and the term Restorative justice are being used without distinction,18 and Restorative 
justice has from the 1990s become a significant and recognized tool of alternative conflict 
resolution.19
However, as can be seen from the conflicts in the world today, it is not obvious when a 
country goes from a stage of conflict to a stage of non-conflict. This study argues that one 
not only has to look beyond the justice and peace divide, as current literature on the issue 
 Containing aspects of Restorative justice, transitional justice also embraces 
various conflict resolution measures. But while conflict resolution traditionally has dealt 
with how to get out of a conflict, transitional justice is aimed to deal with the aftermath of a 
conflict. These dimensions are interesting for the purpose of this study as it opens up for a 
broader understanding of the potential of the transitional justice approach, the potential to 
deal with both past and present human rights violations.  
                                                 
17 Freeman (2009): p.6. 
18 Ex. Fattah (2004).  
19 Barton (2003): p.1. 
 6 
stresses, but also beyond the conflict/non-conflict divide. In this way, the ideas and 
perspectives from transitional justice approaches can be used not only to deal with past 
human rights violations, but also to reach a more effectively way out of a conflict.  
1.2.3 The Colombian Case as an Example 
The third objective of this study is to analyze the aspect of amnesty for human rights 
violations by looking into a specific example; Law 975 of Colombia. The Colombian case 
is interesting when discussing the views on amnesty from a transitional justice perspective 
for two reasons. The first reason is connected with the argument already mentioned about 
transitional justice mechanisms usually dealing with past human rights violations. 
Colombia has started its transitional justice process through Law 975, but is still in a state 
of conflict. As Laplante states: ‘Colombia chose transitional justice mechanisms pre-post-
conflict’.20
 
 This makes the Colombian case particularly relevant, as we are forced to 
rethink the concept of transitional justice as it in this case is used not only after conflicts, 
but also as a tool to get out of a conflict.  
Secondly, the main tool to deal with transitional justice in Colombia is the ‘Justice and 
Peace Law’ (hereinafter Law 975). The law deals with both the victims of the conflict and 
the victimizers (members of illegal armed groups) in the same legal instrument. This 
controversial aspect of the law has been criticized nationally and internationally and by 
victims- and human rights organizations, as it is seen as an instrument that guarantees 
impunity for the former armed groups, rather than a law that secures justice. This study 
aims to give an analysis of the aspect of amnesty in Law 975 in order to discuss whether it 
can be justified from a transitional justice perspective.   
1.3 Methodology  
This thesis is multidisciplinary, and mainly combines the disciplines social science and 
law. My background is within social science, thus a method within this discipline will be 
                                                 
20 Laplante and Theidon (2006): P.51. 
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used. Philosophical and pedagogic reasoning will also be used in discussing the legitimacy 
and justification of amnesty. I will use existing literature on transitional justice and 
amnesty, and in the fifth chapter, Law 975 of Colombia.  
1.3.1 Structure of the Thesis  
This study is organized in five chapters, with this introduction as the first chapter. In the 
second chapter the theory and background for the further study will be laid, addressing 
amnesty and accountability mechanisms, the transitional justice approach, and the place of 
amnesty in the context of the UN. The third chapter deals with arguments against the 
introduction of amnesty laws, addressing arguments of state obligations, deterrence, 
promote the respect for the rule of law, victims’ rights, and the creation of a human rights 
culture and a lasting peace. Chapter four deals with the arguments for of amnesty laws, and 
addresses the arguments of practical obstacles to accountability, amnesty as necessary evil, 
stability and public security, peace, reconciliation, the focus on the victim, and the effect of 
criminal prosecutions. In chapter five these arguments, and the transitional justice 
perspectives on the matter, will be explored through an analysis of the Colombian case. 
1.3.2 Sources 
The sources used in this study will mainly consist of existing literature on the subject of 
amnesty. The book ‘Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions’ by Louise 
Mallinder gives a comprehensive overview of the content and scope of amnesty. I will use 
this book as primary source when presenting the framework of amnesty laws. Other authors 
such as Charles K. B. Barton, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Mark Freeman, Kent Greenawalt, and 
Ronald C. Slye have made useful contributions to the debate of amnesty, and will also be 
important sources of reference in this study. In addition will documents provided by the 
UN be referred to.  
1.3.3 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
All political transitions are unique and it is not possible to predict how an amnesty law will 
affect one certain society. Therefore, one can argue that it is not possible to justify or 
condemn amnesty as such without taking into account the specific conditions. Still, I will 
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argue, a discussion and analysis regarding the justification of amnesty laws in general is 
crucial in order to be able to explore the legitimacy of a specific amnesty law in a specific 
country. This study does not include in-depth studies of the Colombian context, and it 
could be argued that by leaving out the historical and political context, one would not be 
able to present an accurate picture. However, the aim of chapter 5 is not to explore the 
aspect of amnesty within the Colombian context, but rather to explore the actual text law as 
such.  
Law 975 was criticized by the Constitutional Court in Colombia, but a final official version 
incorporating the critique has not yet been made. Therefore, I will in this study use the 
current public version of Law 975. This could be a limitation of the study as some aspects 
of the law might not be considered. However, the aspect of amnesty in the law remains in 
both versions, so this would not have a major effect.  
1.4 Clarifications 
A clarification of terms is necessary in this study. Amnesty is often used along with 
impunity. For the purpose of this study it is important to stress that the meaning of these 
words are not the same, although one can stress that an amnesty in practice gives impunity. 
Amnesty is the granting of impunity in a legal sense, whilst impunity is a practice that is 
unlawful. The definitional element of an amnesty is that it is legal.21 This study will not 
examine the full range of amnesty laws, but concentrate on the amnesty laws that are 
introduced as a response to human rights violations. Mark Freeman refers to Professor Ruti 
Teitel who names such amnesties ‘transitional amnesties’.22
 
 This expression well describes 
the main theme of this study.  
 
                                                 
21 Freeman (2009): p.17. 
22 Ibid. p.17. 
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2 
In this section I will give an introduction to the content, scope and variety within amnesty 
laws, the transitional justice approach, and amnesty in the context of the UN. The theories 
and models presented in this chapter will be used to explore amnesty in chapter three, four 
and five.  
BACKGROUND AND THEORY 
2.1 Amnesty and Accountability Mechanisms  
I earlier stressed the importance of not dividing between criminal prosecutions on the one 
side and impunity on the other, but rather to acknowledge the variation within both of these 
poles. Over the years the recognition of the content and scope of both amnesty and 
accountability mechanisms have evolved and the terms tend to enhance a greater specter of 
mechanisms. The variety of theories, approaches and mechanisms of both amnesty and 
accountability is crucial when discussing the legitimacy of amnesty. It is important to note, 
however, that the mechanisms of amnesty and accountability may in some areas overlap. 
2.1.1 Amnesty Laws 
The word amnesty comes from the Greek word ‘amnéstia’ and means ‘forgetfulness’ or 
‘oblivion’,23 and are official acts that provide an individual with protection from liability – 
civil, criminal, or both – for past acts.24 Amnesties are also always exceptional, and apply 
only to individuals who have not yet been prosecuted and sentenced, and are often 
distinguished from other forms of impunity due to the political context in which they are 
introduced.25 Amnesty assumes that a crime has been committed, and are therefore 
retroactive, applying to acts that were committed before the laws were passed.26
                                                 
23 Mallinder (2008): p.4.  
 An 
amnesty’s legitimacy depends on different elements such. This sections aims to address this 
variation of amnesty laws. 
24 Slye (2000): p.171. 
25 Mallinder (2008): p.4.  
26 Ibid. p.5-6.  
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I. Content and Scope of Amnesty Laws 
One can distinguish between blanket amnesties and conditional amnesties. Blanket 
amnesty can be described as amnesties that apply across the board without requiring any 
application or even an initial inquiry into the facts to determinate if they fit the laws scope 
of application.27 The amnesty in Mozambique in 1992 is an example of a blanket 
amnesty.28 Conditional amnesties requires applicants to perform tasks such as surrendering 
weapons, providing information on former comrades, admitting the truth about their 
actions, or showing remorse in order to benefit from amnesty.29 These conditions can also 
be individualized, so that applicants may only benefit from an amnesty upon successful 
compliance with its conditions.30
II. Methods of Introducing Amnesties 
 The peace and reconciliation process in South-Africa is 
an example of conditional and individual amnesty.  
Methods of introducing amnesty laws can also affect the legitimacy. Four different 
methods by which formal amnesties can be introduced will be presented here, by using 
Mallinder’s list.31 The first method is exercises of executive discretion which refers to 
amnesties that are introduced by presidential decrees or proclamations. They are used to 
release individuals who have been detained for political or religious beliefs, to reduce 
armed opposition and initiate peace negotiations, or to protect those who are loyal to the 
regime. The second alternative is negotiated peace agreements, granting amnesty in 
response to demands from insurgents who require safeguards from prosecution before 
surrendering their weapons. The amnesty in Sierra Leone, 1999, was adopted as part of a 
negotiated peace accord.32
                                                 
27 Mallinder (2008): p.6.  
 The third alternative is statutes which can be introduced to ratify 
provisions of negotiated peace agreements or to respond to demands from civil society or 
the executive. Lastly, the fourth method is public consultation through direct public 
involvement such as consultation programs, through election campaign promises where 
28 Freeman (2009): p.13.  
29 Mallinder (2008): p.5 
30 Ibid. p.5.  
31 Ibid. p.29-36.  
32 Freeman (2009): p.13. 
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voters have the opportunity to express their views, or amnesties could be voted on in a 
referendum. 
III. Reasons for Granting Amnesty 
Although states often have multiple objectives, Mallinder presents six different types of 
motivation for states to introduce amnesties:33
I. Amnesty as a reaction to internal unrest and domestic pressure; 
  
II. Amnesty as a tool for peace and reconciliation; 
III. Amnesty as a response to international pressure;  
IV. Amnesty as a cultural or religious tradition (in certain countries granting amnesty to 
individuals on national or religious holidays is a well-established tradition);  
V. Amnesty as reparation (used in many political transitions to repair the harm 
inflicted upon those who are deemed to be opponents of the state due to their 
ethnicity, or religious or political view); and 
VI. Amnesty as a shield for state agents (may be introduced when governments wish to 
reward the military for its role in establishing the government´s power or 
eliminating political threats).  
2.1.2 Accountability; Content and Scope 
Arguments against amnesty are mainly based on the view that criminal prosecutions are the 
preferable way to achieve accountability and justice. In this respect “amnesty’s 
controversial relation to transitional justice remains principally because of the negative 
impact of amnesties on the achievement of the aims of criminal prosecutions”.34 However, 
just as the reasons and methods for introducing amnesty are crucial to its justification, there 
are also variations within accountability ranging from strict punitive measures to measures 
that may include some sort of amnesty. Bassiouni differentiates between 7 ways in which 
accountability may occur:35
                                                 
33 Mallinder (2008): p.41-68.  
 international prosecutions, international and national 
34 Freeman (2009): p.19. 
35 Bassiouni (2002): p.27-39. 
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investigatory commissions, truth commissions, national prosecutions, neutral lustration 
mechanisms, mechanisms for the reparation of victims, and civil remedies.36
2.1.2.1 Retributive Justice 
 In the next 
two sections I will present two developed theories of how to reach accountability which 
will be useful in the discussion of the transitional justice perspective on amnesty. What is 
interesting to note is that Retributive and Restorative justice, in despite of being described 
as two poles, share some of the same values regarding how to confront crimes. 
Rawls defines Retribution as “the view that punishment is justified on the grounds that 
wrongdoing merits punishment”.37 Retribution carries out what laws threaten, and what 
parties to the social contract promise to bear.38 Retributive justice is the purpose of the 
criminal justice system, and often takes the form of trials or tribunals.39
Retributive theories insist that punishment is justified solely by the offenders’ desert and 
blameworthiness in committing the offence.
  
40 The claim is that punishment – which 
involves doing to wrongdoers things that we ordinarily think of as violating people’s rights, 
like incarcerating them against their will– is morally permissible because it is what 
wrongdoers deserve.41 Thus, the argument against amnesty laws according to this theory 
will be that offenders of human rights violations deserve punishment. By removing the 
possibility of punishment, amnesties are seen as preventing the retributions that a society 
needs to correct the social imbalance created by the crime.42
The use of the word punishment is confusing in this regard. As for accountability, the word 
punishment is often linked to criminal prosecutions. However, there is diversity also within 
the concept of punishment, and to reject criminal prosecutions do not necessarily mean to 
reject all forms of punishment. One critique to this assumption of prosecutions being the 
 
                                                 
36 Civil remedies is the development of the right to bring suit by victims and their heirs, which enables them 
to obtain certain civil remedies). Bassiouni (2002): p.27-39. 
37 Rawls (1971): p.11-12. 
38 Sorell (1999): p.11 
39 Opotow (2002): p.209. 
40 Lacey (2003): p.176. 
41 Zaibert (2006): p.192. 
42 Freeman (2009): p.20. 
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only punitive measure, is that the term retribution is being used to mean nothing more than 
punishment, which is misleading because it ignores the origin of the Latin word: ‘retribuo’, 
meaning ‘I pay you back’.43
Whilst Retributive justice can be described as past-based, the next theory of how to 
confront crimes that will be presented, Restorative justice, can be described as present and 
future oriented.
 Bearing this in mind, certain types of amnesties could also 
serve justice in a retributive way. For example could some kind of conditional amnesty 
which requires the offender to admitting the truth about their actions and provide for 
reparations to the offended, pay the victim back. Clearly, the views on this depend on how 
justice is understood, which will be the underlying discussion throughout the study.  
44
2.1.2.2 Restorative Justice 
 This model is also described as a reaction to the Retributive justice 
perspective. 
Restorative justice attempts to repair the harm caused by criminal behavior, and its core 
values include: mutual respect; the empowerment of all parties involved in the process; 
accountability; consensual, non-coercive participation and decision-making; and the 
inclusion of all the relevant parties in dialogue.45 In the preamble to the recommendations 
made to the Council of Europe by the ‘Committee of Experts on Mediation in Penal 
Matters’, the benefits of restorative justice are summarized as flexible, comprehensive, 
problem-solving, participatory, and viable alternative to traditional criminal proceedings. It 
recognizes the victim by giving them a stronger voice, encourages the offenders’ sense of 
responsibility, and offers a way to reintegration and rehabilitation.46
Many definitions of Restorative justice emphasize the importance of a dialogic process, and 
focus on a face to face meeting with victims and offenders where they themselves must 
determine the outcome of that meeting.
  
47
                                                 
43 Barton (2003): p.17. 
 Advocates for Restorative justice argue that for 
44 Fattah (2004): p.28 
45 Young and Hoyle (2003): p.200 
46 Fattah (2004): p.19 
47 Young and Hoyle (2003): p.201 
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many offenders it can provide a viable alternative to prison.48 However, Barton is more 
restricted in denying criminal prosecutions as such, and argues that some appropriate level 
and form of punitiveness will enhance the effectiveness of the Restorative justice response, 
and will often have to form part of agreements to be acceptable to the parties.49 He further 
claims that by failing to recognize this point, advocates for restorative justice are hindering 
their own cause and creating confusion about it, because of the belief that punishment and 
retribution are incompatible with restoration.50 Young and Hoyle argue that it is a mistake 
to regard Restorative justice as an un-punitive practice, and it is likely to be seen by many 
victims as a more punitive response than small fines and conditional discharges.51 In 
practice, Barton argues, restorative justice incorporate both punitive and retributive 
measures, which is important because unless punitive outcomes are allowed to be part of 
agreements, alternative conflict resolution processes will never be an accepted practice in 
criminal justice.52
In the context of this study, dealing with human rights violations, it is important to 
emphasize that Restorative justice is often applied to young offenders who have not 
committed serious crimes.
  
53 It may therefore be argued that Restorative Justice may not be 
applicable to cases of human rights violations, as the crimes dealt with here are indeed 
serious crimes. However, in recent years there has been emerging argumentation for the use 
of Restorative justice mechanisms as an acceptable way to also confront human rights 
violations. Young and Hoyle, for example, argue that there are a number of different 
schemes which use Restorative justice interventions for adult offenders and for more 
serious crimes.54
                                                 
48 Young and Hoyle (2003): p.199 
  
49 Barton (2003): p.22 
50 Ibid. p.23 
51 Young and Hoyle (2003): p.208 
52 Barton (2003): p.21-22 
53 Young and Hoyle (2003): p.203 
54 Ibid. p.203 
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2.2 An Approach to the Debate of Amnesty; Transitional Justice (TJ) 
In section 2.1 two developed models of how to reach justice and accountability were 
presented. However, as noted above, these two models are not necessarily suitable to 
address past human rights violations. I already mentioned that Restorative justice 
traditionally has been used to address less serious crimes. As for Retributive justice, it is 
now generally accepted that full accountability with criminal prosecutions of all the 
perpetrators after a conflict is often impossible. This means that these two theories cannot 
automatically be used as models of how to confront past human rights violations, thus other 
models or perspectives have to be used. Transitional justice (hereinafter TJ) is an approach 
that has been developed in order to present a more comprehensive and holistic approach to 
the discussion of how to confront past human rights violations. I will therefore use this 
approach when discussing amnesty laws. Retributive and Restorative justice will only be 
used to illustrate aspects of the TJ perspective.  
TJ refers to the actions made by a state in a post-conflict country to make up for the past. 
There are as noted earlier, several definitions of transitional justice, but I will here refer to a 
definition by the United Nation Security Council:  
The notion of transitional justice (…) comprises the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with 
a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial 
mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (…) and individual prosecutions, reparations, 
truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.55
I will now briefly present the content of the four most important mechanisms of TJ that are 
often used to describe what TJ perspectives emphasize.  
 
2.2.1 Criminal prosecutions 
Bassiouni differentiated between international prosecutions and national prosecutions when 
confronting violations.56
                                                 
55 UN Doc. S/2004/616 (2004) :p.4.   
 He further argues that international prosecutions should be limited 
56 Bassiouni (2002): p.27-39. 
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to leaders, policy-makers and senior executors, and that there must be prosecutions for at 
least the four jus cogens crimes.57 The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the main 
instrument dealing with international prosecutions, based upon the conviction that “the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the 
national level and by enhancing international corporation”.58 Prosecutions at the national 
level should, according to Bassiouni, include all persons who have committed criminal 
acts, including the four jus cogens crimes.59
2.2.2 Reparations 
 
Mechanisms for the reparation of victims are a cornerstone of establishing accountability 
for violations and achieving justice for the victims,60 and can include monetary and non-
monetary elements, such as restitution of victims’ legal rights, official apologies, 
monuments, commemorative ceremonies and programs of rehabilitation.61 Reparations 
became important in the international community with the adoption of the 1985 
‘Declaration of basic principles of Justice for victims of crime and abuses of power’.62 
These principles were updated in 2005 with the UN ‘Basic principles on the right to 
remedy and reparation for victims’.63 Reparations are also a fundamental component of the 
process of Restorative justice.64
2.2.3 Truth-seeking Mechanisms  
   
There are two kinds of truth-seeking measures65
                                                 
57 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998): Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of 
aggression.  
: truth commissions and international and 
national investigatory commissions. Truth commissions focus on past events, attempting to 
discern the overall picture of a conflict, and exist for a finitive period of time. Sriram 
58 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998).  
59 Bassioun i(2002): p.27-39. 
60 Ibid. p.27-39. 
61 Gierycz (2008): p.6.  
62 UN Doc. A7Res/40/34 (1985).  
63 UN Doc. A/res/60/147 (2005). 
64 Bassiouni (2002): p.27-39. 
65 Ibid. p.27-39. 
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defines truth commissions as a compromise approach between amnesty and prosecution.66 
It is argued, amongst others by Bassiouni, that truth commissions can provide some sort of 
accountability for past human rights violations.67 Truth commissions are also a 
fundamental element of Restorative justice.68
2.2.4 Vetting and Neutral Lustration Mechanisms 
 International and national investigatory 
commissions are assigned to document violations by collecting evidence of criminality, in 
addition to other fact finding information of more general nature. 
Vetting and lustration programs are initiated to remove past offenders from the public 
sector.69 It is a process whereby individuals who supported or participated in violations 
committed by a prior regime may be removed from their positions and/or barred from 
holding positions of authority in the future.70 Past offenders can be current political offices 
and/or social positions, including military police, senators, teachers, doctors, and priests.71 
Accountability for their actions may involve sanctions of which the two most common are 
publicly revealing an individual’s past activity and a ban on holding public office.72
2.3 Amnesty in the Context of the UN 
 
Before turning to the arguments for and against amnesty laws, some general views on 
amnesty by the UN will be useful in order to get an overview of the place of amnesty in an 
international context. Recent years have seen an increased focus by the UN concerning 
amnesty and accountability in conflict and post-conflict societies. There is currently no 
explicit prohibition of amnesty in any human rights, humanitarian, or criminal law treaty, 
and no single treaty that in an explicit way discourages any kind of amnesty.73
                                                 
66 Sriram (2004): p.12. 
 However, 
the absence of a prohibition of amnesty is not because of unawareness of the issue. Several 
67 Bassiouni (2002): p.42. 
68 Opotow (2002): p.209. 
69 Vinck and Pham (2008). 
70 Bassiouni (2002): p.27-39. 
71 Nalepa (2009): p.45. 
72 Ibid. p.45. 
73 Freeman (2009): p.32.  
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attempts have been made in order to approach and build a common understanding of the 
subject.  
The first study of the problem of amnesty in the UN was in 1985 by Louis Joinet.74 This 
led to a new study in 1997 that ended with the elaboration of a series of 50 principles to 
prevent immunity against punishment, divided into four main parts; the principle of the 
right to know, the principle of justice, the principle of the right to reparation, and 
guarantees of non-recurrence.75 These principles continue to be issues of concern in TC 
approaches to the present day, and in 2005 an updated set of principles was set forth.76
The attempts to strengthen the rule of law have gained attention in the UN system over the 
last years, and could be seen as an attempt to at least minimize the use of amnesty laws. In 
a report by the Secretary General on the UNs support for the rule of law it is emphasized 
that the rule of law and transitional justice issues now are being consistently integrated into 
the strategic and operational planning of new peace operations. It is further emphasized that 
Member States now almost universally recognize the establishment of the rule of law as an 
important aspect of peacekeeping.
  
77 In this report it is also referred to a meeting on ‘Justice 
and the rule of law’ in 2004, where the President of the Security Council stressed the 
importance and urgency of the restoration of justice and the rule of law in post-conflict 
societies, not only to come to terms with past abuses, but also to promote national 
reconciliation and to help prevent a return to conflict (see S/PRST/2004/34).78 Further on, 
in the 2005 General Assembly World Summit, the Heads of State and Government 
identified the rule of law as one of four key areas that demanded greater attention, and 
Member States reaffirmed their commitment to an international order based on the rule of 
law and international law.79
                                                 
74 Andreassen og Skaar (1998): p.64. 
 These approaches to strengthen the rule of law illustrate the 
international commitment to limit the use of amnesty laws, despite the lack of a direct 
prohibition.  
75 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20 (1997).  
76 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (2005).  
77 UN Doc .A/61/636 (2006): p.1.  
78 Ibid. p.3.  
79 UN Doc. A/61/636 (2006): p.4. 
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3 
In this section the most common arguments against amnesty will be presented and 
discussed. I will further explore whether these arguments against amnesty are be justifiable 
from a TJ approach. Four arguments against amnesty will be explored. These arguments 
have in common the view that criminal accountability is crucial when confronting human 
rights violations.  
ARGUMENTS AGAINST AMNESTY LAWS 
3.1 The Obligation to Ensure Criminal Accountability  
Several general human rights conventions ICCPR80 and ECHR81 obligate states to ensure 
the rights enumerated therein. But even though most of the international human rights 
documents mainly serve to ensure the rights, the obligations to prosecute and punish are 
also incorporated in various international documents. For example, in ECOSOC Resolution 
2005/3082, it is articulated in article 4 that “in cases of gross violations of international 
human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law constituting 
crimes under international law, states have the duty to investigate and, if there is sufficient 
evidence, the duty to submit to prosecution the person allegedly responsible for the 
violations and, if found guilty, the duty to punish her or him”. International conventions 
that clearly provide for a duty to prosecute humanitarian or human rights crimes are the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Genocide Convention, and the Torture Convention.83
Furthermore, in 1971 the General Assembly adopted a resolution on war criminals 
affirming that a state´s refusal to “cooperate in the arrest, extradition, trial and punishment” 
of persons accused or convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity is “contrary to 
the UN charter and to generally recognized norms of international law”,
  
84 and in 1973 a 
resolution consisting a set of principles on the matter was adopted.85
                                                 
80 ICCPR; art 2(1). 
 Even if these do not 
81 ECHR: art 1. 
82 ECOSOC Resolution 2005/30, art. 4.  
83 Scharf and Rodley (2002): p.92. 
84 Cryer (2005): p.106. (refered to General Assembly Resolution 2840, UN Doc. A/8429)  
85 UN Doc. A/9030 (1973). 
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exist to actually prohibit amnesties, they emphasize accountability for violations of the 
rights set forth in the human rights documents.  
The Inter-American System of Human Rights has played a role in expanding international 
human rights obligations.86 This began when the IACHR issued a landmark decision on the 
matter in the ‘Velásquez Rodríguez case’ in 1988, where the court held that “(…) States 
must prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the 
Convention (…)”87 [emphasis added]. The Inter-American Commission also took a strong 
position for the duty to prosecute when stating that regarding truth commission the 
investigations and payments of compensation were “not enough”. In this way, the IACHR 
became one of the first international human rights monitoring bodies to find amnesty laws 
contrary to basic human rights principles.88 These decisions within the Inter-American 
System have bridged international criminal justice and human rights law by recognizing 
that criminal responsibility is fundamental to the punishment of serious human rights 
crimes.89 However, decisions made by the Commission are not legally binding, and 
therefore states often responded by either ignoring its recommendation, or argues the need 
to balance peace with justice to justify the laws.90
This argument of the obligation to ensure criminal accountability is based on the holding 
that “amnesties, by their very nature, are exceptions to the obligation to prosecute”.
  
91
                                                 
86 Laplante (2009): p.936-939. 
 This 
argument is crucial from a TJ perspective, where the aspect of ensuring criminal 
accountability is one of the core principles. It is also argued that amnesties also may breach 
‘investigation obligations’, which is obligations that may appear in human-rights-related 
treaties alongside with prosecution obligations. However, there are competing views of 
whether this exception is really a ‘violation’ of the obligation to ensure criminal 
accountability, and the case would be different if the amnesty includes non-judicial 
87 Ibid. p.937. 
88 Ibid. p.938 
89 Ibid. p.939. 
90 Ibid. p.938. 
91 Freeman (2009): p.62. 
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investigations such as truth-recovery mechanisms.92
3.1.1 Accountability for Serious Human Rights Crimes  
 A TJ approach to this might be that 
amnesties are exceptions to the obligation to prosecute, but there are also other ways to 
ensure accountability. Yet, criminal accountability for the most serious human rights 
violations is crucial.  
The UN does not recognize any amnesty for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.93 This strong standing 
regarding the zero tolerance for granting amnesty for serious human rights violations 
became clear with the creation of the ICC, which came into force on the 1st of July 2002. 
The fundamental reason for the creation of this court is that the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished, and to put an 
end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention 
of such crimes.94 The establishment of the ICC represents both a paradigm shift and the 
culmination of a recent trend toward accountability for international crimes.95 However, 
states have demonstrated a resolute unwillingness to agree to even the mildest 
discouragement, and even when negotiating the Rome Statute for the ICC neither a 
prohibition nor a discouragement was incorporated.96
Despite of the lack of a prohibition of amnesty, the UN approach is firm. In a report on 
‘The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies’ by the UN 
Secretary-General, it is undertaken by the UN Secretariat to ensure that peace agreements 
and Security Council resolutions and mandates reject “any endorsement of amnesty for 
genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity (…)”.
 
97
                                                 
92 Freeman (2009): p.41. 
 Freeman argues that it is 
93 UN Legal Council, O’Brien (2008): p.4.  
94 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998).   
95 Freeman (2009): p.73. 
96 Ibid. p.33. 
97 Ibid. p.45. 
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preferable that an amnesty excludes these kinds of crimes,98 but holds fast the importance 
of exceptions.99
The TJ approach has a clear standing regarding the understanding of states’ obligation to 
ensure criminal accountability at least for serious human rights crimes. The fact that there 
are various mechanisms aiming at securing accountability within TJ perspectives shows 
that there is an understanding of the different levels of human rights violations. The view is 
that the most serious violations should be dealt with by ensuring criminal accountability, 
whilst the other TJ mechanisms can be used to ensure accountability for the less serious 
crimes. Thus, from a TJ perspective, amnesty for serious human rights violations should be 
rejected. This point is connected with the purpose of strengthening the respect for the rule 
of law and deter future abuses, which is the next argument.  
 
3.2 Deterrence and the Promotion of the Respect for the Rule of Law 
A second argument against amnesty is that criminal accountability deters future abuses and 
strengthens the respect for the rule of law,100 and that failure to punish encourages cynicism 
about the rule of law and distrust toward the political system.101 According to this 
argument, accountability mechanisms are important because they tend to shore up legal and 
social controls which are preventive.102 Bassiouni states that accountability mechanisms 
appear to be solely punitive, but they are also preventive through enhancing commonly 
shared values and through deterrence.103 The international community, lead by the UN, has 
given this subject a lot of attention. Several resolutions on the subject have been adopted, 
and it is stated on the websites that “Establishing respect for the rule of law is fundamental 
to achieving a durable peace in the aftermath of conflict, and to the effective protection of 
human rights (...)”.104
                                                 
98 Freeman (2009): p.25. 
  
99 Ibid. p.8. 
100 Sriram (2004): p.7. 
101 Scharf and Rodley (2002): p.90. 
102 Bassiouni (2002): p.51. 
103 Ibid. p.52. 
104 UN and the rule of law: http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw/index.shtml.  
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Mallinder acknowledges that amnesties could encourage distrust toward the political 
system, but believes that the positive benefits of trials only can be achieved where the 
necessary evidence and resources are available to put individuals on trial, and where the 
prosecutions do not reignite the violence.105 Freeman agrees with Mallinder and argues that 
not every amnesty is inherently at odds with deterrence, an amnesty that makes non-
repetition a condition of retaining its benefits would be consistent with the goal of 
deterrence.106 However, as Mallinder notes, in many situations amnesties are introduced 
repeatedly rather than a definitive closing of the past.107 Slye expresses concerns about this 
aspect and stresses that the use of amnesties will create an expectation that such amnesties 
will be available in the future, and thus decrease deterrence against future violations.108
From a TJ perspective it could be argued that the aspect of deterrence and the aspect of 
promoting the respect for the rule of law are strong arguments against the introduction of 
amnesty laws as the overall goal of TJ is “to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past 
abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”.
 
This aspect of amnesty of tending to repeat itself would surely weaken the rule of law 
rather than strengthen it.  
109
                                                 
105 Mallinder (2008): p.16-17.  
 
However, the way in which the amnesty is introduced may have an effect on the public 
opinion. According to Mallinder and Sriram, amongst others, this has a great impact on 
how amnesty is received by the civil society. One method of introducing amnesty that 
might promote belief in the system is through ‘public consultation’. If a successful 
inclusive public consultation process occurs, it could be argued that amnesty might also 
promote respect for the law. It might also be said, however, that a successful inclusive 
consultation process to occur in a post-conflict society may not be very likely to occur, 
given lack of stability.  
106 Freeman (2009): p.21. 
107 Mallinder (2008): p.68.  
108 Slye (2000): p.183.  
109 UN Doc. S/2004/616 (2004):4.  
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3.3 Victims´ Rights 
The argument regarding victims’ rights are presented under this chapter of ‘arguments 
against amnesty laws’ as there has traditionally been an understanding that criminal 
accountability is a necessity to secure victims their rights; and that amnesty is contradictory 
to this goal. TJ advocates argue that this is a crucial aspect when discussing amnesty laws, 
and one of the main arguments against the practice of these laws. However, as this section 
will show, there are many arguments stressing that in certain circumstances, amnesty laws 
may better serve the victims’ rights, but that this depends on the amnesty.  
3.3.1 The Right to Truth 
In the literature there is no single answer to whether the granting of an amnesty works 
against the right to truth or contributes to it. The question most debated deals with the 
quality of the truth reveled in an amnesty hearing as opposed to a trial. One argument is 
that trials produce information that is more reliable because they not only provide direct 
testimony from the accused, but also produce information that has been subjected to the 
rigors of legal process and the rules of evidence.110 The contra argument claims the 
opposite; that trials are generally ill-suited in providing a complete history of past 
atrocities,111 and that “the threat of trials can also lead to intensive perpetrator efforts to 
destroy evidence of mass crime, thus significantly endangering truth recovery efforts”.112
Slye defends the latter position, and argues that the lessons from the South-African 
amnesty process shows that formal trials are not the only, nor the best forum where 
victims’ rights to truth can be met.
 
113 He holds that the quantity, and most likely also the 
quality, of the information elicited from amnesty hearings was higher than what would 
have been elicited from criminal trials.114
                                                 
110 Slye (2000): p.172-173.  
 Greenawalt argues that if a truth commission can 
111 Bassiouni (2002): p.32. 
112 Freeman (2009): p.24. 
113 Slye (2000): p.173-174. 
114 Ibid. p.177. 
 25 
draw testimony from those to be granted amnesty, much more will be revealed about past 
abuses than would be possible in criminal trials and it would take much less time.115
Another aspect that is debated is the question of what setting the offender is likely to tell 
the whole truth; in an amnesty hearing or in a trial. Scharf and Rodley argue that the most 
authorative rendering of the truth is possible only through the crucible of a trial that accords 
full due process, and that the granting of an amnesty encourages the guilty to try to escape 
the judgment of history by reinventing the truth.
  
116 Slye, in contrast, argues that the 
participation of the accused in an amnesty hearing is at least as good as in a trial because in 
an amnesty hearing it is the accused that initiate and voluntarily participate in the 
proceeding because they are seeking a benefit.117 However, as Slye points out, a challenge 
for both trials and amnesty hearings is that defendants and applicants will tailor their 
testimony based on the legal requirements for, in the first case, acquittal, and in the second, 
amnesty.118
The form of the amnesty is of importance at this point. Whether it is blanket; conditional; 
and in the case of the latter, what conditions that are emphasized; is crucial with regards to 
the amnesties’ potential to contribute to revealing to truth. Mallinder emphasizes the 
combination of amnesty with accountability measures as crucial in order to achieve a 
genuine truth. She argues that in addition to the ‘carrot’ of the amnesty, the ‘stick’ of 
prosecutions is arguably necessary, as without the genuine threat of legal proceedings the 
highest level offenders are unlikely to apply for amnesty, which will inhibit the degree to 
which the truth is uncovered.
  
119
One conclusion that can be drawn from the above discussion is that the revealing of the 
truth in an amnesty process is crucial for it to be legitimized by the victims. From a TJ 
perspective this aspect is important, and a TJ approach would not support an amnesty 
unless it assists the work of other TJ mechanisms.  
  
                                                 
115 Greenawalt (2000): p.203. 
116 Scharf and Rodley (2002): p.90. 
117 Slye (2000): p.173-174.  
118 Ibid. p.175. 
119 Mallinder (2008): p.15. 
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3.3.2 The Right to Justice 
This argument suggests that accountability for the offenders would best secure the victims’ 
right to justice. Scarf and Rodley states that to the victims, amnesty represents the ultimate 
in hypocrisy: “while they struggle to put their suffering behind them, those responsible are 
allowed to enjoy a comfortable retirement”.120 There are two elements to question in this 
statement: One, would criminal prosecutions of the violators automatically help the victims 
to put their suffering behind them? According to Restorative justice perspectives, this is not 
necessarily the best way to put the suffering behind, and other means of accountability may 
better heal the wounds and contribute to reconciliation. One of the aspects Sriram notes as 
one of the main reasons for those who argue that past human rights abuses must be 
punished is how the victims feel.121
The second question is: will those responsible enjoy a comfortable retirement? This 
depends on the amnesty, as some forms of amnesties include alternative forms of 
punishment, what is above referred to as conditional amnesty. Greenawalt differentiates 
between six dimensions along which amnesties may vary, where three of these include 
forms of punishment. This includes the possibility for the amnesty to be ‘partial’, which 
allow for a smaller degree of punishment or liability for damages. The amnesty may not 
protect persons from ‘consequences other than legal liability’, ex. being fired from jobs etc, 
and the amnesty may include ‘alternative scheme to compensate victims’.
 However, is it the actual punishment that decides how 
the victims feel, and is prosecutions the only way of punishing violators to obtain justice? 
Advocates for Restorative justice might disagree to this point, and argue that trials do not 
automatically mean that the victims are able to put the suffering behind them.  
122
But what about the victims’ right to justice? Would they not want the offenders to be put 
behind bars? Evidence suggests that the public is much less vindictive than is commonly 
supposed, and that the more people know about the circumstances of an offence and an 
   
                                                 
120 Scharf and Rodley (2002): p.91.  
121 Sriram (2004): p.6. 
122 Greenawalt (2000): p.195. 
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offender, the less punitive they tend to become.123 In addition, those who have recently 
been victims are generally no more punitive than non-victims.124 Mallinder discusses the 
diversity of views on amnesty among victims within transitional states, and argues that 
victims´ needs and wishes relate to the context. They may be willing to prioritize concerns 
such as peace, stability and reconstruction over measures to prosecute those responsible for 
past crimes. Victims views towards amnesty are not statistic, she argues, and it is common 
that it changes over time. They may prioritize physical security in the aftermath of mass 
violence, but as time passes and the climate becomes more secure, their needs may change 
to concerns of and support for prosecutions or truth-recovery.125
As earlier claimed, elements of Restorative justice are included in TJ perspectives. TJ 
mechanisms as truth-seeking, lustration and victims reparation are examples of Restorative 
justice, and the Restorative argument will thus be of importance in order to interpret 
whether an amnesty can be justified with regards to the victims’ right to justice. I will 
therefore present a Restorative argument to the question of amnesties’ effect on the 
victims’ right to justice.  
  
Restorative justice holds offenders accountable by requiring them to explain how they 
think their actions might have affected others. Through dialogue it is hoped that the 
victims’ feelings of anger or fear towards their offender will be alleviated and that 
offenders will experience genuine remorse and develop a greater sense of empathy.126
                                                 
123 Young and Hoyle (2003): p.219. 
 Of 
course, this must be seen as the ideal outcome for victims and offenders. Skeptics might 
argue that offenders, at least some in cases of grave violations, could be so damaged by the 
violence and conflict that a genuine remorse might not be realistic. However, for the 
offender, it is likely to believe that meeting with the victim face to face will probably give a 
much stronger impression and understanding of the suffering he or she has caused the 
victim, than jail time.  
124 Ibid. p.220. 
125 Mallinder (2008): p.12.  
126 Young and Hoyle (2003): p.200. 
 28 
As for the victim, it is not sure that the anger or fear towards the offender will alley, and 
there is a possibility that they feel that the offender do not get the punishment he or she 
deserves. Greenawalt claims that for victims that have an opportunity to testify and face 
offenders, perhaps a kind of justice is done. But, Greenawalt claims, even if this 
opportunity is valuable, it is not equivalent of criminal punishment, and there is still a 
widespread understanding that ordinary justice is desirable for the individuals involved.127
The argument against amnesty for the sake of the victims’ right to justice depends of course 
upon the understanding and definition of justice. From a perspective of TJ, the concept of 
justice will include criminal prosecutions, reparations, and truth-seeking, leaving its likely 
view on conditional amnesty open for discussion.  
 
Amnesty may be reducing future injustices, but this does not eliminate the elements of 
injustice.   
3.3.3 The Right to Remedy and Reparation 
The right to remedy is established in various human rights treaties, and includes both 
judicial and non-judicial mechanisms.128 The obligation to ensure an effective remedy in 
the event of a human rights violation appeared as early as the adoption of the UDHR.129 
This right is also articulated in ICCPR130, CERD131, and in ECHR132. According to the UN 
‘Basic principles on the right to remedy and reparation for victims’, the victims’ right to 
remedies include a) equal and effective access to justice; (b) adequate, effective and prompt 
reparation for harm suffered; and (c) access to relevant information concerning violations 
and reparation.133
                                                 
127 Greenawalt (2000): p.200. 
 This definition of the victims’ right to remedy and reparation is wide, 
and does not exclude measures others that criminal prosecutions. Bassiounis presentation 
of the seven ways in which accountability may occur could be used to summarize the 
measures that may be used to secure the victims’ right to remedy and reparation: 
128 Freeman (2009): p.40. 
129 Ibid. p.39. 
130 ICCPR, article 2 (3).  
131 CERD, articl 6.  
132 ECHR, article 13.  
133 UN Doc. A/RES/60/147 (2005): p.6, section VII. 
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international prosecutions, international and national investigatory commissions, truth 
commissions, national prosecutions, neutral lustration mechanisms, mechanisms for the 
reparation of victims, and civil remedies.134
It might also be argued from a ‘realpolitik’ perspective that ‘equal and effective access to 
justice’ (a) may be difficult or even impossible in a conflict/post-conflict society where the 
numbers of victims and offenders are numerous. This principle opens up for interpretation 
of what is meant by ‘justice’. And it is not implicit that by justice it is meant criminal 
prosecutions.  
 
Principle (b) also opens for interpretation and discussion regarding what is actually an 
‘adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered’. Scharf and Rodley argue 
that “prosecuting and punishing the violators would give significance to the victims 
suffering, and serve as partial remedy for their injuries, help them restore dignity, and 
prevent private acts of revenge”,135 but can there be a kind of reparation even in cases 
where amnesty is included? Reparations can also be investigatory commissions or truth 
commissions.136
Reparations are an important part of TJ mechanisms, and are viewed as a crucial aspect of 
how to make up for the harm done when confronting past human rights violations. 
However, reparations can from a TJ perspective be secured in different ways, both 
judicially and non-judicially. Whilst “an amnesty that remove the right to go to court to 
obtain civil relief for human rights violations would directly contradict the right to 
 So it might be argued, that a conditional amnesty processes which 
includes truth-seeking mechanisms may serve as reparation. In this way, truth-seeking 
mechanisms could also facilitate ‘access to relevant information concerning violations and 
reparation’ (principle c). However, the views are conflicting whether truth-commissions or 
trials actually contributes to the most accurate and widespread truth (see discussion in 
section 3.3.1), and this would also be contextual.  
                                                 
134 Bassiouni (2002): p.27-39. 
135 Scharf and Rodley (2002): p.90. 
136 Bassiouni (2002): p.38-39. 
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remedy”,137
3.4 The Creation of a “Human Rights Culture” and a Lasting Peace 
 an amnesty that is accompanied by other TJ mechanisms does not necessarily 
violates these rights. 
The last argument against amnesty laws that will be discussed, is the holding that 
accountability is crucial to create a ’human rights culture’ in a society where the rights are 
respected, and thus build the foundation for a lasting peace. The idea is that “a society is 
not reconciled with its violent past unless it works toward the creation of a culture of 
respect for fundamental human rights”.138
In the international community this is a strong argument against amnesty, as can especially 
be seen in the UN system. The UN 
 This point is closely linked to the argument in 
section 3.2.  
Secretary General states in a report on ‘The Rule of 
Law and Transitional Justice’, that the UNs experience in the past decade has demonstrated 
that the consolidation of peace in the immediate post-conflict period, as well as the 
maintenance of peace in the long term, cannot be achieved unless the population is 
confident that redress for grievances can be obtained through legitimate structures for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes and the fair administration of justice.139 Likewise, the 
General Assembly of UN stressed in a report that impunity for serious crimes and atrocities 
which may have occurred before, during and after the conflict can seriously jeopardize 
peace building efforts during an early phase.140
In order to achieve this, it is argued for the importance of a viable criminal justice system. 
The idea is that only a viable criminal justice system can protect and guarantee 
accountability, avoid impunity and ensure a lasting peace.
  
141
                                                 
137 Freeman (2009): p.40. 
 Another aspect of this 
argument is that if those responsible for war crimes are included in the peace process (as 
would be the case in an amnesty hearing), those individuals as well as their agenda are 
138 Slye (2000): p.171.  
139 UN Doc. S/2004/616 (2004): p.3.  
140 UN Doc. A/63/881-S/2009/304 (2009): summary.   
141 Bassiouni (2002): p.54. 
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legitimized, and it is likely to be an increased possibility of continued atrocities or a 
fundamentally flawed peace agreement.142
Barton argues that in terms of long-term solutions to criminal behavior, the successfulness 
will depend on the degree that it succeeds in a) challenging the offender’s psychological 
mechanisms of moral disengagement; b) aiding the moral and social development of the 
offender, so that they learn from the experience; c) aiding emotional healing from the 
trauma of the criminal incident; and d) tempering unequivocal disapproval of the offender’s 
wrongful behavior with expressions of respect for the individual as part of a community 
(reintegration). He further argues that these conditions will tend to be realized under 
conditions of empowerment of the victims and the offenders, and that empowerment is 
fundamental in Restorative justice.
 According to these last two aspects, an amnesty, 
which by nature does not support the criminal justice system, and which includes the 
responsible in the process, would not support the creation of a human rights culture and a 
lasting peace.  
143 According to this view the promotion of respect for 
human rights and thus a lasting peace has little to do with criminal prosecutions, it rather 
depend upon alternative mechanisms of accountability. To reach and seek to transform the 
root-causes of the conflict are according to this view crucial, and criminal prosecutions 
alone will not serve this purpose. Mallinder argues that where an attempt is made to 
address the root causes of the conflict, there is a greater chance for a lasting peace to 
develop, and that a conditional amnesty may better address these root causes than criminal 
prosecutions.144
The important thing will be, from a TJ perspective, that there is enough accountability to 
create a human rights culture and secure a lasting peace. It is argued that a society is not 
reconciled with its violent past unless it works toward the creation of a culture of respect 
for fundamental human rights.
  
145
                                                 
142 Williams (2002): p.117. 
 There are two reasons for that: one cannot be reconciled 
if there is a feeling of injustice; and the lack of accountability for the past endangers the 
143 Barton (2003): p.59-60. 
144 Mallinder (2008): p.16-17. 
145 Slye (2000): p.171.  
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creation of a human rights culture.146 Slye states that in the case of recent amnesties there is 
some suggestion that amnesties that incorporate little, if any, accountability do not enjoy 
legitimacy a few years after their promulgation.147
3.5 Concluding Remarks: What Kind of Justice? 
  
This chapter has presented four arguments against amnesty, and two findings have been 
significant. The first finding is that the arguments presented against amnesty may also be 
used as arguments for amnesty. This is particularly clear with regards to the victims’ rights. 
Secondly, this chapter has illustrated that TJ perspectives in many of the sections would be 
likely to represent a view that at least some kind of amnesty could be acceptable, and 
secure a degree of accountability. However, for an amnesty to be justified from a TJ 
perspective it has to be a conditional amnesty. It must be accompanied with TJ 
mechanisms, and ensure criminal accountability for the most serious crimes. The 
underlying view of the TJ perspectives is that some form of accountability is crucial when 
confronting human rights violations.     
According to opponents of amnesty, amongst them Bassiouni, there is a view that the 
dilemma of peace vs. justice has in most conflicts been resolved at the expense of 
justice.148
After a decade-long debate on how to “reconcile” peace and justice or how to “sequence” them, the debate 
is no longer between peace and justice but between peace and what kind of justice.
 This aspect is the core of the arguments against amnesty; that it works against 
justice. But what is meant by justice? What is just to some might be unjust to others. The 
concept of justice is vague and the meaning depends on the context.  
149
This statement by the UN shows the growing recognition that there is a variety of ways to 
reach justice, and that criminal prosecutions is not the only answer. There are various ways 
to confront past human rights violations and approach the aspect of amnesty in this process, 
and the views are many on, as noted above; what kind of justice that is preferable.  
   
                                                 
146 Slye (2000): p.179.  
147 Ibid. p.182. 
148 Bassiouni (2002): p.53.  
149 UN Doc. SG/SM/12446 L/3147 (2009): paragraph 6.  
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In this section the most common arguments for and attempts to justify amnesty will be 
presented and discussed. I will further explore whether these arguments for amnesty are 
justifiable from a TJ approach. Six arguments for amnesty will be explored. These 
arguments have in common the view that the current criminal justice system, which 
emphasizes criminal prosecutions, does not, or at least not always, serve its purposes of 
promoting peace and justice in a post-conflict society. In contrast, these six arguments 
claim that amnesty, or more accurate; some forms of amnesty, may better serve these 
purposes.  
ARGUMENTS FOR AMNESTY LAWS 
4.1 Practical Obstacles to Accountability 
The argument that there are practical obstacles to full accountability through criminal 
prosecutions is often used to justify amnesty laws. The basis for this argument is that it will 
in most cases be impossible to punish all of the offenders after a conflict, and that amnesty 
may solve this problem by at least securing the impunity to occur ‘de jure through the 
granting of amnesties’, rather than ‘de facto through the failure of a state to enforce legal 
norms either willingly or as a result of an insufficient legal infrastructure’.150
Bassiouni argues that accountability never should be bartered away for political 
settlements.
 The argument 
is based upon the conviction that an amnesty at least would not to the same degree as 
impunity discourage respect for the rule of law. 
151 But, he adds, this does not necessarily mean that every individual violator 
must be prosecuted in order to assure accountability.152
                                                 
150 Bassiouni (2002): p.26. 
 Boraine states that full 
accountability is not always possible in a society in transition, and that even when a 
tribunal has been appointed, it is not always possible to fulfill in its entirety the mandate to 
bring to books all of those who have been involved in the human rights violations. In 
addition, he states, criminal prosecutions are time-consuming and securing evidence 
leading to a conviction is often problematic. Most countries are unable to afford costly 
151 Ibid. p.7. 
152 Ibid. p. 41-42.  
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trials, so relatively few will be prosecuted and the majority of offenders will go free.153 
Another obstacle that Mallinder presents is that for justice to be effective it is required that 
the proceedings be fair and the rights of the accused respected, which is not always the case 
in periods of conflict, as the legal infrastructures may be in a state of collapse, or there may 
be a lack of financial resources and trained and impartial personnel.154
Bassiouni’s argument in this section well describes the TJ perspective on the problem of 
introducing amnesty because of practical obstacles to accountability. In a TJ perspective, 
practical obstacles are not necessarily a good reason to barter away accountability. Yet, 
where full accountability is not possible, truth-seeking and lustration mechanisms are 
options that can serve to at least secure some of the victims’ rights and to ensure some 
degree of accountability. Still there is a concern that bartering away accountability means 
that ‘peace’ is prioritized before justice. This is problematic from a TJ perspective where 
there is a believe that justice is a necessity to achieve peace. However, this assumption of 
prioritization is debated. Freeman claims that focusing on peace as the first step in a 
transitional sequence does not necessarily imply that justice is a lower priority, and he 
refers to Moses Okello:  
 
If the preferred sequencing is peace followed by justice, this in no way signals that justice is a lower 
priority than peace – quite the opposite, in fact- whichever way you look at it, trying to ensure that the 
environment is conductive for a comprehensive pursuit of justice…is definitive proof that you want 
real justice to be done.155
4.2 The Lesser Evil Argument 
  
The lesser evil argument is based upon the view that there is a contradiction between 
‘peace’ and ‘justice’, and that there is a “very real danger that prosecutions intended to 
strengthen the rule of law and nascent democracy could have the reverse effect”.156
                                                 
153 Boraine (2000): p.147.  
 This 
justifies the introduction of an amnesty at the basis that it would be a ‘lesser evil’. A 
statement by John Rawls in the book ‘A theory of justice’ well explains this argument: “an 
154 Mallinder (2008): p.14. 
155 Freeman (2009): p.19.  
156 Sriram (2004): p.10.  
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injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid an even greater injustice”.157
it is quite easy to criticize the ‘lesser-evil’ argument as an outsider who has never known, or who does not 
directly face massive and entrenched terror. But that for persons who suffer under it daily, the immorality of 
amnesty choices is not as easy to judge, and they may be prepared to tolerate sacrifices to justice that in any 
other context would be unthinkable to them. Faced with a choice between survival and justice, we should not 
be surprised if justice ranks as a lower priority, where the amnesty may represent the least worst option at a 
particular point in time.
 This 
holding has been widely criticized for bargaining away justice for political settlements, and 
it is believed, also from a TJ perspective, that this will not create a lasting peace and a 
‘human rights culture’ where human rights are respected. Mark Freeman, in contrast, is 
amongst them who defend this view and argues that:  
158
Opponents of this argument hold that this is not a sufficient reason to overlook other rights, 
and that this in fact is a violation of victims’ rights. Freeman, however, argues that 
rejecting an amnesty may also be a violation of other rights. This could be the case if for 
example the threat of prosecutions against a small number of leaders is in the way of 
reaching peace in the context of a civil war, and an amnesty could prevent the murder and 
maiming of potentially hundreds of people. He raises the following question: “if an 
amnesty could prevent a social cataclysm, could its opposition be defended – legally or 
otherwise – merely on the basis of a prior legal obligation to prosecute?”
  
159
The argument of amnesty as the lesser evil might not be a sufficient argument to overlook 
other rights from a TJ perspective. Yet, truth-seeking mechanisms and vetting, which are a 
part of the TJ approach, could also be seen as a second-best option where trials are deemed 
too be destabilizing.
  
160
                                                 
157 Rawls (1971): p.4. 
 So when full criminal accountability is not possible in the aftermath 
of a conflict, truth-seeking mechanisms or vetting could at least serve some level of 
accountability and be a lesser evil.  
158 Freeman (2009): p.23. 
159 Ibid. p.59. 
160 Roht-Arriaza (2006): p.3. 
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4.3 Stability and Public security 
A forth argument for amnesty is the question whether accountability should be the top 
priority by a fragile democracy, or if the priority should be stability and public security. 
Sriram argues that there is a very real danger that prosecutions intended to strengthen the 
rule of law could have the reverse effect. Thus, she argues, reformers may have to accept 
amnesties and other compromises.161 Even if one ideally might want to punish perpetrators 
for abuses, the fear of retribution by those perpetrators may be convincing that amnesty are 
preferable to coups.162
Introducing amnesties because stability and public security are prioritized is often seen as a 
violation of certain rights, especially victims’ rights. Freeman however, reaches another 
conclusion. He rank public security at the top of the list of priorities, and describes that the 
thought of living with impunity is insignificant compared with the thought of living with 
open, armed conflict or state terror.
  
163 He further claims that a person may place general 
value on justice, but if he or she suddenly had to choose between survival and justice, this 
would undoubtedly affect the way that person values justice.164
The stability argument can be interpreted from two angles. One is the views presented 
above; that criminal prosecutions may create reactions in the society that seems 
destabilizing, thus an amnesty may create more stabile conditions where peace can be 
reached. It can be argued, however, that this is a short term situation and outcome. The 
other angle is the view, which is shared by TJ approaches, that accountability in the long 
term is necessary in order to create legitimacy and democratic stability, and that criminal 
accountability is an important measure to accomplish this.  
 
4.4 Peace 
The argument of peace is one of the most common justifications for introducing amnesty 
laws. The view is that where mercy is shown to former enemies, the justification for further 
                                                 
161 Sriram (2004): p.10.  
162 Ibid. p.10.  
163 Freeman (2009): p.8. 
164 Ibid. p.7. 
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violence will diminish and the conditions for a lasting peace could develop.165
If we insist, at all times and in all places, on punishing those who are guilty of extreme violations of human 
rights, it may be difficult or even impossible to stop the bloodshed and save innocent civilians. If we always 
and everywhere insist on uncompromising standards of justice, a delicate peace may not survive.
 Even though 
the UN generally advocates the importance of the rule of law, this argument is also 
recognized. The former Secretary-General stated the following in a meeting about justice 
and the rule of law:   
166
However, there are still strong arguments for the need for accountability in order to, as 
discussed above, achieve a lasting peace. Kofi Annan continues his statement: 
   
But (…) if we ignore the demands of justice simply to secure agreement, the foundations of that agreement 
will be fragile, and we will set bad precedents. 167
These statements exemplifies that an agreement on the dilemma is still not reached, and the 
debate continues between those who emphasize justice and those who emphasize peace. 
Those who advocates for criminal prosecutions as a necessity in order to achieve a lasting 
peace, often argues that “the attainment of peace is not necessarily to the exclusion of 
justice, because justice is necessary to attain peace”.
 
168 It is according to this view claimed 
that accountability must be recognized as an indispensable component of peace and 
eventual reconciliation.169
4.4.1 The importance of the Form of the Amnesty 
 I will now present arguments that are commonly being used to 
justify amnesty in this context of the goal of achieving peace while at the same time 
securing some degree of justice in order to achieve a lasting peace.    
Mallinder states that granting amnesty does not mean that peace will be achieved, but that 
the failure of amnesty to end violence may not be attributed to the amnesty itself but rather 
                                                 
165 Mallinder (2008): p.16-17. 
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to the wider political context in which it was introduced.170
I. Content and Scope 
 According to this it is argued 
for the recognition of the variety of amnesty laws, and for an understanding of this variety 
as crucial to the justification and legitimacy of the amnesty.  
It is not obvious what kind of amnesty that would better promote peace, whether blanket or 
conditional. However, what has been argued is that blanket amnesty that do not require any 
conditions, is no longer ‘accepted’ by the international community. Still, one can argue that 
certain kinds of limitations may hinder peace with for example insurgency groups which do 
not agree with these limitations in order to reach a peace agreement. On the other side, 
conditional amnesties that requires applicants to perform tasks such as surrounding 
weapons, may contribute to a decrease in violence. What becomes relevant in this 
discussion is the distinction between short term and long term goals of peace. Advocates 
for TJ might at this point argue that in order to achieve a lasting peace, limitations are 
crucial. However, as Freeman points out, it is important to recognize that even a principled 
amnesty cannot guarantee accountability in practice.171
II. Methods of Introducing Amnesty 
 
The method of which the amnesty is granted can substantially affect the amnesty’s 
potential to contribute to peace.172 In the theory chapter four different methods by which 
formal amnesties can be introduced were presented.173
                                                 
170 Mallinder (2008): p.12. 
 The first method was exercises of 
executive discretion.  Mallinder points out that in introducing amnesty by executive 
discretion there is a risk for arbitrary exercises of presidential discretion, and suggests that 
a process of debate and negotiation better would strengthen the rule of law. The second 
method was to introduce amnesty laws as part of negotiated peace agreements. According 
to Mallinder, this method can potentially be more democratic than presidential decrees as 
they involve representatives of the parties to the conflict or transition process and 
171 Freeman (2009): p.31. 
172 Mallinder (2008): p.29. 
173 Ibid. p.29-36.  
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international observers. The third method was through statutes. Mallinder argues that the 
legitimacy of this method can be reduced in different ways; for example for those who do 
not support the regime, when the politicians are not elected, or where it is approved by a 
bare majority in a divided legislature. Mallinder notes that in such cases consultation is 
desirable and that attempts should be made to address the concerns of those who are against 
the amnesty. The forth method is through public consultation. In this proceeding, argues 
Mallinder, the inclusiveness of the consultation process will depend on the conditions 
within each transitional state, where the quality of the communication infrastructure and the 
security concerns may destabilize the process.  
From a TJ perspective, emphasizing victims’ rights to truth, justice and reparation, it would 
be important to include the victims in the amnesty process. Regarding the three first 
methods of introducing amnesty, through exercises of executive discretion, negotiated 
peace agreements, and negotiated peace agreements, the victims’ voice would be limited, 
as Mallinder points out. The forth method, however, amnesties introduced through public 
consultation, have a greater chance of including the parties to the conflict, and would seem 
to be the method that best correspond with the values of TJ.  
III. Reasons for introducing amnesty 
In the theory chapter Mallinder presented six different types of reasons for states to 
introduce amnesties. I will in this section focus on the first motivation that has to do with 
amnesty as a reaction to internal unrest and domestic pressure, as I see this as the most 
important to this discussion on the amnesty’s impact on peace.   
Mallinder differentiates between three types of reactions to internal unrest and domestic 
pressure.174
                                                 
174 Mallinder (2008): p.41-46.  
 The first one, amnesty to consolidate power, is used as a show of strength to 
demonstrate that any opposition does not pose a threat to its rule. The second, amnesty to 
pacify serious unrest, could be used for example to pre-empt threatened military coups 
where a new regime has taken office but military remains powerful, or in the wake of failed 
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military coups to pacify the military and encourage their corporation with the government. 
The third form, amnesty to end violent conflict, can potentially contribute to reducing 
human right violations when a conflict is ongoing by creating conditions to enable peace 
negotiations to occur.  
The two first reactions, amnesty to consolidate power and amnesty to pacify serious unrest, 
could be seen as connected to the argument of amnesty for stability reasons. However, 
from a TJ perspective, it might be argued that criminal prosecutions better would create this 
stability, as discussed above. If the third reaction, amnesty to end violent conflict, can 
contribute to reduce human rights violations by creating conditions to enable peace 
negotiations to occur, as Mallinder argues, this reason for amnesty may seem justifiable 
from a TJ perspective. But in any case, irrespective of the reasons for introducing the 
amnesty, a TJ perspective would emphasize that some sort of accountability is necessary 
for the amnesty to be justified.  
4.5 Reconciliation 
The argument for amnesty as a contributor to reconciliation is based upon the conviction 
that looking towards the future, rather than reliving the pain and suffering of the past, is the 
way to reconciliation.175 The idea is that this would make a clean break with the past, 
creating a common starting point for all members of society from which a better future may 
be created. However, the validity of this argument will depend on how reconciliation is 
defined. The goals of reconciliation have been described as ‘coexistence’, ‘normalcy’, and 
‘social (and moral) reconstruction’.176
                                                 
175 Mallinder (2008): p.46-48.  
 Yet, one can impose different meanings into these 
definitions, and it might be argued that these goals can be achieved through an amnesty as 
well as through trials. The debate of short-term vs. long-term outcomes is also relevant in 
this discussion, and would be the issue of debate between those who are pro- and those who 
are against amnesty.  
176 Roht-Arriaza (2006): p.12. 
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One argument against this holding is that reconciliation cannot be used to foster impunity 
against punishment,177 and that without justice through prosecutions there can be no 
reconciliation. Slye claims that accountability is important to reconciliation not only 
because of its impact on victims, but also for its impact on the perpetrators because if there 
is a widespread feeling amongst victims that the perpetrators are ‘getting away with it’, 
reconciliation will be difficult.178 He also argues that accountability is important to the 
perpetrators because it is connected to their ability and willingness to contribute to 
reconciliation, and it may increase the possibility that perpetrators will be reintegrated in 
the society by bringing some form of closure to that chapter of their life.179
The argument of amnesty as a contributor to reconciliation is strongly challenged by TJ 
perspectives. According to TJ approaches, accountability for former human rights violators 
is crucial for the victims to be reconciled with the past. However, truth-seeking, reparations 
and lustration are all alternative accountability mechanisms, and can accompany an 
amnesty. But still, criminal prosecutions are an important element of TJ, at least for the 
most serious crimes.  
  
4.5.1 The importance of the Form of the Amnesty 
The same overview of the methods and reasons for introducing amnesties that was used in 
the section on peace can be used in this section, as this variety is also important when 
discussing the argument of whether amnesty can be seen as a contributor to reconciliation.  
I. Content and Scope 
From a TJ approach, an amnesty would need to be conditional and individual in order to 
serve as a tool for reconciliation. Using Greenawalt’s list of the variations within amnesty 
laws180
                                                 
177 Andreassen and Skaar (1998): p.66.  
, it would seem likely that those variables that best seem to serve the purpose of 
reconciliation from a TJ perspective is an amnesty that is: 1) limited, 2) require 
178 Slye (2000): p.179. 
179 Ibid. p.180. 
180 Greenawalt (2000): p.195. 
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applications, 3) requiring truth-telling, 4) including civil liability, 5) is partial, 6) does not 
protect persons from consequences other than legal liability, and 7) include alternative 
scheme to compensate victims. 
II. Methods of Introducing Amnesty 
As for the goal of achieving peace, the preferable methods in order to achieve 
reconciliation from a TJ perspective would be through public consultations. This is a view 
shared by Mallinder. She claims that for any amnesty program to contribute effectively to 
national reconciliation, it is desirable that it is implemented following the method of 
widespread consultation.181
III. Reasons for Introducing Amnesty 
  
Mallinder presented six different types of reasons for states to introduce amnesties. I will in 
this section focus on the second motivation that has to do with amnesty as a tool for peace 
and reconciliation, as I see this as the most important to the discussion in this section. 
Mallinder differentiates between four reasons national governments use to justify amnesty 
processes by using the argument of reconciliation182
                                                 
181 Mallinder (2008): p.60. 
: reconciliation as national unity is 
based on the argument that achieving such unity is contingent upon closing the books on 
the past rather than reinforcing grievances and raising tensions by investigating the crimes. 
Reconciliation as forgetting builds upon the idea of a clean break from the past, and as a 
way for governments to either hide their own crimes or as a symbol that the period of 
violence is over. A third reason is reconciliation as forgiveness. This method can be 
problematic as a state can forgive, but not force individuals to forgive their perpetrators.  
The fourth reason is reconciliation through the establishment of democracy. The claim is 
that transitional states must establish democratic structures for resolving disputes 
peacefully, and amnesties can contribute to this process as part of a package of reforms that 
182 Ibid. p.49-59. 
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address the root causes of the violence, by increasing access to decision-making and 
resources. 
Introducing an amnesty in order to achieve ‘national unity’, for the purpose of ‘forgetting’ 
the violations, or ‘forgiving’ the violators, would not be defensible from a TJ perspective. 
The goal of national unity by ‘closing the books’ on the past is not in accordance with the 
TJ view on the importance of investigating past crimes in order to be able to move on. 
According to TJ the truth about what happened is crucial for reconciliation to occur, and 
simply try to forget would not serve the goal of reconciliation. As mentioned above, the 
introduction of amnesty for the purpose of forgiving is also problematic from a TJ point of 
view, as the victims cannot be forced to forgive. Andreassen and Skaar propose that maybe 
should a more realistic understanding of reconciliation contain tolerance of the fact that one 
has to live side by side with the ones that have done the harm, without necessarily forgive 
the acts committed.183
4.6 The Effect of Criminal Prosecutions 
 As for the fourth purpose, ‘the establishment of democracy’, this is a 
core goal of TJ, and the aim of transitions. If an amnesty can contribute to this, it would be 
likely that an amnesty could be tolerated as part of a broader set of mechanisms including 
other TJ measures.  
There are strong arguments for the obligation to ensure accountability at least for serious 
human rights violations, as discussed in chapter 3. However, a discussion of the effect of 
criminal prosecutions belongs to this chapter. One can argue from a Retributive perspective 
that offenders deserve criminal prosecutions. Still, there are views arguing that criminal 
prosecutions as punishment is not an effective way to confront crimes. Again, these 
holdings are mainly discussed in relation to less serious crimes than human rights 
violations, but are still an important contribution to the debate of what is most effective. 
The holding that criminal prosecutions are not the only alternative when confronting past 
human rights violations is based on two variables.  Firstly, as Young and Hoyle argue, the 
lack of evidence that imprisonment has contributed to a reduction in crime has led to a 
                                                 
183 Andreassen and Skaar (1998): p.23.  
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widespread questioning of custodial sentencing.184 McConville analyzes the use of 
punishment for crimes, and argues that punishing an adult for a particular behavior will 
probably suppress the behavior temporarily. He further argues that changing the scripts, 
beliefs, and attitudes that support that behavior while it is suppressed is much more 
difficult. As a result, once the punishment is removed, the behavior is likely to return.185
The second variable is the actual suffering of the person that has violated a certain right; 
the doing to someone of things that if done to them in other circumstances would violate 
their most significant rights.
  
186 This aspect leads to the question whether one has a right to 
violate others rights. Zaibert questions this rhetoric of treating a person in a way that would 
otherwise violate his rights, is automatically permissible simply because the person 
deserves this kind of treatment.187
From this perspective, as opposed to TJ perspectives, criminal accountability is not only 
ineffective but also seen as the doing of another unjust. According to TJ perspectives, 
however, criminal prosecutions are an important part of the approach for reasons 
mentioned in chapter three. Yet, where criminal prosecutions are not possible, other TJ 
mechanisms can serve the purpose of accountability.  
  
4.7 Concluding Remarks: An Alternative Way to ‘Justice’? 
It has been argued in both chapters three and four that from a TJ perspective amnesty 
cannot be justified without securing at least some sort of accountability for the responsible. 
The thought is that if no steps are taken to do good what has been done wrong in the past, a 
real democracy cannot be built. At the same time, in the short term it might be risky to put 
people at trial; if the military is not under full civil control and the violators have been put 
at trials, a government may jeopardize a military coup.188
                                                 
184 Young and Hoyle (2003): p.199. 
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justice accompanied by amnesty secure both peace through stability, and justice for the 
victims? 
This chapter has presented 6 arguments for amnesty. A point of interest with regards to the 
justification of amnesty from a TJ approach is that TJ perspectives in many of the sections 
would be likely to agree with the holdings arguing that at an amnesty can be justified. But 
still the requests for some form of accountability are strong. However, is could be argued 
from a TJ perspective that a conditional amnesty could serve as an alternative way to 
justice. An alternative way that has the potential to both secure peace through stability, and 
justice through the accompaniment of TJ mechanisms.    
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The previous chapters have analyzed amnesty and how TJ perspectives may and may not 
allow for its justification. This chapter attempts to use the arguments and discussions from 
the previous chapters to explore a specific example of a law where the aspect of amnesty is 
included; Law 975 of Colombia. The case will be explored by (1) defining its form; and (2) 
discussing the legitimacy and justification of the law from a TJ perspective. I will explore 
the legitimacy and justification by using the arguments for and against amnesty. 
THE COLOMBIAN CASE AS AN EXAMPLE 
Law 975 was approved by the Congress on July 25th 2005,189 and attempts to deal with 
both peace and justice in the same document. It is stated in article 1 that the purpose of the 
law is to facilitate the processes of peace, and the individual or collective reincorporation 
into civilian life of the members of illegal armed groups, guaranteeing the victims’ rights to 
truth, justice, and reparation.190 Organizations and scholars have questioned the two-
dimension of the law as it deals with both the victims’ rights and grants amnesty to 
demobilized illegal armed groups in the same legal document. However, the inclusion of 
both peace and justice in the same document is not new. In the UN Charter it is stated that 
the UN is determined to “establish conditions under which justice and respect for the 
obligations arising from the treaties and other sources of international law can be 
maintained (…)”. Further it is stated that UN is also determined to “unite our strength to 
maintain international peace and security (…)”.191
5.1 The Content and Scope the Amnesty in Law 975 
 This illustrates that these two goals, of 
peace and justice, have both been integrated parts of the Human rights discourse from the 
beginning. However, this duality is still worth discussing. An interesting aspect in this 
study is whether a TJ approach allows for this duality to be justified.  
I will in this section explore the aspect of amnesty in law 975 by using the schemes of 
Mallinder presented in section 2.1 in order to decide the content and scope of the aspect of 
                                                 
189 Law 975 (2005). 
190 Ibid. article 1. (my translation). 
191 UN Charter, preamble.  
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amnesty in the law. Further will the establishment of the content and scope be used in the 
discussion on the justification for the amnesty from a perspective of TJ.  
I. The Content and Scope of the Amnesty in Law 975 
The aspect of amnesty in Law 975 is linked to the demobilization process in Colombia, 
which is the act of individually or collectively putting down weapons and abandon the 
illegal armed group.192 The demobilization process was initiated in 2003 and officially 
completed in 2006. Law 975 has the role of facilitate the peace process after the 
demobilization, and to ensure the right to justice by holding the demobilized paramilitaries 
accountable for their crimes.193
The first way of which a form of amnesty is included in Law 975 is by giving immunity 
from criminal prosecutions to the demobilized combatants. During the demobilization the 
combatants was obligated to register their names, level of involvement in the armed illegal 
group, and if they had violated any human rights or humanitarian law. If they did not admit 
to any such crimes and had no pending cases against them in the judicial system, these 
combatants were given immunity from prosecutions (in line with Decree 128 of 2003).
 Law 975 deals with the process of demobilization in 
chapter 2 of the law, and amnesty is linked to this process in two ways: 
194
The second way of which a form of amnesty is included in Law 975 is through so called 
alternative sentences. Of the 31.671 combatants that had been demobilized In Colombia, 
2.716 had criminal proceedings opened against them or admitted involvement in crimes 
once demobilized, and was thus subject to the process of Law 975. In these cases 
investigative processes are entered where the accused are confronted with claims by the 
prosecutor about criminal acts. In regular criminal prosecutions the crimes could be 
punishable with sentences of between 20 and 60 years in prison, but under the framework 
of Law 975 an alternative punishment of five to eight years (depending on the gravity of 
the crime) is offered given that the combatant comply with the conditions in the law.
  
195
                                                 
192 Law 975, art 9. (my translation). 
 In 
193 García-Godos and Lid (2010): p.27.  
194 Ibid. p.28. 
195 Ibid. p.28-29. 
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articles 10 and 11 the requirements are listed, and includes among other things: the 
surrendering of weapons; the ceasing of all illegal activity; the providing of information on 
former comrades; the delivering of goods and property gained from the illegal acts (as part 
of the reparation to the victims); and admitting the truth about their actions.196 Denial of 
involvement and/or failure to meet the conditions leads to the transfer of the case to regular 
legal proceedings following ordinary criminal law.197
According to this, the term conditional amnesty would describe the amnesty in law 975 as 
it requires conditions to be filled in order to benefit from the amnesty. These conditions are 
also individualized in so that applicants may only benefit from an amnesty upon successful 
compliance with its conditions.
  
198
II. Methods used when Introducing Law 975 
 From a TJ perspective, the conditions, requirements and 
reduced sentences in Law 975 makes the aspect of amnesty justifiable.  
Among the four methods that were presented by which formal amnesties can be introduced, 
a combination of three methods was used when introducing the amnesty in Law 975. 
Firstly, one method by which the amnesty in Law 975 was introduced was through 
negotiated peace agreement, as the origins of Law 975 lies in previous legislative attempts 
to end the armed conflict.199
It was earlier stressed that the methods used to introduce an amnesty affects its legitimacy 
and justification. From a TJ perspective the method of public consultation was the 
 Further, the method of introducing amnesty through statutes, 
may also be a method used to include the amnesty in Law 975, as it was introduced to 
ratify provisions of the negotiated peace agreement. Lastly, the method of introducing the 
amnesty through exercise of executive discretion can be described as a method for the 
inclusion of amnesty in Law 975. This method refers to amnesties that are introduced by 
presidential decrees or proclamations. However, Law 975 is also approved by the Congress 
(including the critique).  
                                                 
196 Law 975, article 10 and 11.  
197 García-Godos and Lid (2010): p.28-29. 
198 Law 975(2005): article 10 and 11. 
199 García-Godos and Lid (2010): p.15. 
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preferred method for the amnesty to be justified. However, this method is the only one that 
was not used with regards to the inclusion of amnesty in Law 975.  
III. Reasons for granting Amnesty in Law 975 
There have been many speculations about the reasons for including amnesty in Law 975. 
Especially speculations considering the amnesty as a shield for state agents, is widely 
debated. It is not possible, however, to establish the reasons why the amnesty was included 
in the Colombian law. For this reason a TJ view is also impossible. However, it might be 
interesting to explore some of the most widely recognized reasoning for including amnesty 
laws in general, without arguing what could be the case for Colombia. Six different types 
of reasons for states to introduce amnesties were presented in chapter 1. I will here only 
mention those that are relevant for the amnesty in Law 975.  
One reason for including amnesty is as a reaction to internal unrest and domestic pressure. 
Mallinder differentiated between three types of reactions to internal unrest and domestic 
pressure, where the third form was to introduce amnesty in order to end violent conflict. As 
the origin to Law 975 was attempts to end the armed conflict, this is a possible reason. It 
was argued that introducing amnesty for this reason could potentially contribute to 
reducing human right violations when a conflict is ongoing, by creating conditions to 
enable peace negotiations to occur. If this is the case, this reason for amnesty would seem 
justifiable from a TJ perspective.  
Another reason is to introduce amnesty as a tool for peace and reconciliation. Mallinder 
differentiated between four motivations for introducing amnesty by using the argument of 
reconciliation, where all may be relevant for the amnesty in Law 975: reconciliation as 
national unity; reconciliation as forgetting; reconciliation as forgiveness; and reconciliation 
through the establishment of democracy.  
I earlier argued that introducing amnesty in order to achieve national unity, for the purpose 
of forgetting the violations or forgiving the violators, would not be justifiable from a TJ 
perspective. The purpose of national unity would not be a sufficient reason as it is believed 
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from a TJ perspective that investigating past crimes is crucial in order to create national 
unity and reconciliation. The purpose of forgetting or forgiving would not seem justifiable 
from a TJ perspective (discussed is section 4.5.1). As for the fourth purpose, the 
establishment of democracy, this is a core goal of TJ and would be tolerated by TJ 
perspectives as part of a broader set of TJ mechanisms.  
A third reason for introducing amnesty is as a response to international pressure, and could 
possibly be a reason for including amnesty in Law 975. The people of Colombia have 
experienced internal armed conflicts since its independence,200 and the international 
community has occasionally issued pressure on the government, especially the international 
human rights movement. The establishment of the ICC, which Colombia ratified in 2002201
5.2 Points of Interest regarding the Aspect of Amnesty in Law 975 
, 
may also have contributed to international pressure.    
I will in this section use the arguments for and against amnesty in chapter three and four, to 
highlight the aspect of amnesty in Law 975. I will further decide whether the amnesty 
could be justifiable from a TJ perspective.  
5.2.1 The Obligation to Ensure Criminal Accountability 
Colombia is state party of The Torture Convention (CAT)202 which is one example of an 
international convention that clearly provides for a duty to prosecute humanitarian or 
human rights crimes. Article 2 of the Convention states that “each state party shall take 
effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in 
any territory under its jurisdiction”.203
                                                 
200 García-Godos and Lid (2010): p.6.  
 However, does this mean that granting an amnesty 
would be a violation of this obligation? It was argued in chapter three that amnesties, by 
their very nature, are exceptions to the obligation to prosecute. In this way it could be 
argued that for example practical obstacles to the fulfillment of full accountability for all 
the human rights violations, gives the right to make an exception from the obligation to 
201 ICC website. 
202 Bayefsky.  
203 CAT, article 2.  
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prosecute. Whether this is the case for Colombia will be discussed in section 5.2.4. Other 
arguments used to justify an exception to the obligation to prosecute are stability, public 
security and peace. The legitimacy for these arguments will be explored in relation to the 
Colombian case in this chapter.  
It was also argued that the TJ approach is that there are other ways to ensure accountability 
than criminal prosecutions, but that criminal accountability for the most serious human 
rights violations is crucial. Does the amnesty in Law 975 allow for enough accountability 
to occur from a TJ perspective? The creation of the ICC established the obligation to ensure 
accountability for at least the most serious crimes for the member states. However, 
Colombia made a declaration stating that “none of the provisions of the Rome Statute 
concerning the existence of jurisdiction by the ICC prevent the Colombian State from 
granting amnesties, reprieves or judicial pardons for political crimes, provided that they are 
granted in conformity with the Constitution and with the principles and norms of 
international law accepted by Colombia (…)”.204 Yet, the granting of amnesty does not 
automatically mean that accountability is not secured. Law 975 ensures alternative 
accountability mechanisms, such as truth-telling and reparations, which are in accordance 
with TJ perspectives. The alternative sentences, however, only consist of five to eight years 
in prison205
5.2.2 Promotion of the Respect for the Rule of Law and the Building of a Human 
Rights Culture 
 whilst, as mentioned, regular criminal prosecutions could consist of sentences 
of between 20 and 60 years. The question from a TJ perspective will be if 5 to 8 years are 
enough with regards to serious human rights violations.  
A second argument against amnesty presented above was the idea that failure to punish 
human rights crimes encourages cynicism about the rule of law and distrust towards the 
political system, especially in situations where amnesties are introduced repeatedly. 
Regarding the case of Colombia, amnesties have been introduced repeatedly; in 1981206
                                                 
204 Freeman (2009): p.285.  
, 
205 Law 975 (2005): art.29. 
206 Freeman (2009): p.332 
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1982207, and in 2003208
According to this argument, an amnesty which does not support the criminal justice system 
would not contribute to the creation of a human rights culture and a lasting peace. As the 
amnesty in Law 975 includes alternative accountability measures and reduced sentences, 
these additional alternative accountability measures could from a TJ perspective contribute 
to the creation of a human rights culture even with the presence of an amnesty. Again, the 
question from a TJ perspective will be if there is enough accountability to create a human 
rights culture and secure a lasting peace, and if the pattern of repeating amnesty might in 
fact promote disrespect for the rule of law.  
. It can be argued that this aspect may affect the respect for the rule 
of law and thus the goal of deterrence and the creation of a human rights culture. 
5.2.3 Victims’ Rights 
The rights of the victims are emphasized in Law 975, and introduced in article 6, 7, and 8 
which aim to secure the victims’ right to truth, justice and reparation. But how does the 
aspect of amnesty affect the rights initially given to the victims? 
Regarding the right to truth it was argued that an amnesty accompanied by truth-seeking 
mechanisms can reveal much more about past abuses than would be possible in a series of 
criminal trials and it would take much less time. In order to benefit from the amnesty in 
Law 975, truth-telling is required. Article 7 of the law establishes the right to the truth by 
stating that the victims have the inalienable, full, and effective right to learn the truth about 
the crimes committed by illegal armed groups.209 In addition does victims have the right 
during the amnesty hearings to follow proceedings directly, ask questions through their 
representatives, provide information to advance the process, and assist in identifying 
related events or the whereabouts of hidden assets, mass graves etc.210
                                                 
207 Freeman (2009): p. 336.  
  In this sense, the 
amnesty in Law 975 would seem to be justifiable according to TJ perspectives.  
208 Ibid. p. 329.  
209 Law 975, article 7. (my translation). 
210 García-Godos and Lid (2010): p.29. 
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As noted above, from a TJ perspective, the concept of justice will include criminal 
prosecutions, reparations, and truth-seeking. Law 975 contains all these elements. Article 6 
of the law establishes the right to justice by stating that the State has the duty to undertake 
an effective investigation that leads to the identification, capture, and punishment of 
persons responsible for crimes committed by the members of illegal armed groups.211
As we have seen, the right to reparation is articulated in ICCPR (art 2 (3)), and CERD (art 
6), amongst others, which Colombia is State party of.
 The 
alternative sentences included in Law 975 also serve the victims’ right to justice, and 
secure a degree of accountability, even with the presence of the amnesty. According to 
these elements of justice in Law 975, it seems likely to be accepted from a TJ perspective.  
212 The right to reparation and remedy 
was in the UN ‘Basic principles’213 defined as including (a) equal and effective access to 
justice; (b) adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered; and (c) access to 
relevant information concerning violations and reparation. By nature, an amnesty makes 
the first element of this definition difficult to obtain, and the Colombian case is no 
exception. However, according to Law 975 the victims are able to file cases, and 
alternative sentences may thus be an outcome. The second and third elements are also 
given attention in the law, in article 8 and 7 respectively. Article 8 establishes the right to 
reparation, stating that the victims’ right to reparation includes the actions taken for 
restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.214
Reparations can also be guarantees against repeated violations.
 
Article 7 is connected to the right to truth, and is referred to above.  
215
                                                 
211 Law 975 (2005): article 8 (my translation). 
 Article 8 of Law 975 
articulates the connection between the rights of the victims and the alternative sentences of 
the victimizers, stating that the victims´ rights and guarantees of no repetitions are 
212 Bayefsky.  
213 UN Doc. A/RES/60/147 (2005): p.6, section VII. 
214 Law 975 (2005): article 8 (my translation). 
215 Bassiouni (2002):p. 38-39. 
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understood, amongst other things, as demobilization and dismantlement of the illegal 
armed groups.216
Throughout the paper it has been argued that the form of the amnesty, whether it is blanket, 
conditional or something in between, have major impact on the amnesty’s potential to 
contribute to the victims’ right to truth, justice and reparation. In the Colombian case, truth-
seeking mechanisms, reparations and limited criminal prosecutions are conditions that are 
required in order to benefit from the amnesty. From a TJ perspective this aspect is crucial, 
as a TJ approach would not support an amnesty unless it assists the work of other TJ 
mechanisms such as truth-commissions and reparations. Another important aspect is that 
the goals of justice and reparation for the victims of the Colombian armed conflict would 
most likely not be achieved without the effective demobilization and reintegration of illegal 
armed actors.
  
217
5.2.4 Practical Obstacles to Accountability and the Lesser Evil Argument 
 In this way, the amnesty, which the demobilization process is an integrated 
part of, is important to secure victims’ rights. However, a weak aspect of this kind of 
amnesty is that the degree to which justice is achieved depends on whether the members of 
the former illegal armed group apply for the amnesty and admit their crimes. If they do not 
apply or admit the crimes, the victims’ right to justice will be limited.  
Could the argument that there are practical obstacles to the securing of full accountability 
through criminal prosecutions be used to justify the amnesty in Law 975? As noted above, 
criminal prosecutions are time-consuming and securing evidence leading to a conviction is 
often problematic, especially in conflict/post-conflict societies as Colombia, where the 
conflict has been going on for many years and the perpetrators are numerous.  
From a TJ perspective, where full accountability is not possible, truth-seeking, reparations 
and lustration mechanisms are options that can serve to secure some of the victims’ rights 
and to ensure some degree of accountability. The Colombian case can fit into the category 
of countries where full accountability is not possible, and a conditional amnesty securing 
                                                 
216 Law 975 (2005): article 8 (my translation). 
217 García-Godos and Lid (2010): p.46. 
 55 
some degree of accountability would thus be the alternative. This point of discussion is 
closely linked with the argument for amnesty as a lesser evil.  
The lesser evil argument, as noted, is based upon the view that an amnesty may be a lesser 
evil when full accountability is not possible. Could the amnesty in Law 975 be justified on 
the basis that it is a lesser evil? I earlier argued that full criminal accountability would not 
be possible in Colombia, and that other TJ mechanisms thus could be useful in order to 
reach an alternative accountability. As the amnesty in Law 975 is accompanied with other 
TJ mechanisms as truth-seeking mechanism and reparation, this amnesty could at least 
contribute to some level of accountability and be a lesser evil.  
5.2.5 Stability, Public Security and Peace 
Should criminal accountability be top priority in Colombia, or should the priority be 
stability, public security and peace? In the case of the latter, is the amnesty in Law 975 
necessary to secure this? In order to attempt to answer these questions specifically related 
to the Colombian context, an in-depth study of the Colombian conflict would be necessary. 
However, some points can be discussed related to the Colombian case without needing to 
discuss the Colombian conflict as a whole. 
From a TJ perspective, the form of the amnesty is crucial to the justification and legitimacy 
of the amnesty for the purposes of reaching stability, public security and peace. Introducing 
amnesty on the basis of these reasons would not necessarily be legitimized form TJ 
perspectives as TJ approaches emphasize accountability as crucial to achieve a lasting 
peace. Still, the amnesty in Law 975, by being a conditional amnesty, reaches some of the 
goals of TJ such as truth, reparations and reduced sentences, which would also contribute 
to stability and peace.  
5.2.6 Reconciliation and a Common Starting Point 
Would the amnesty in Law 975 contribute to reconciliation and a common starting point? 
Included in Law 975 alongside with the amnesty are mechanisms that will secure some sort 
of accountability, and may contribute to reconciliation more effectively. However, the 
question is again if there is enough accountability to ensure effective and long-term 
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reconciliation, as accountability for former human rights violators is crucial according to TJ 
approaches for the victims to be reconciled with the past.  
The argument for amnesty as a contributor to creating a common starting point is more 
complex in the Colombian case, as there is still a conflict in the country. This makes the TJ 
process in Colombia an unusual and widely debated case, as TJ is “institutional initiatives 
for dealing with past atrocities”218
5.3 Concluding Remarks; Is the Amnesty in Law 975 Justifiable?  
 (emphasis added). Because of the ongoing conflict there 
are reasons to believe that peace will have to be achieved before one can start thinking of a 
new start. I would argue that the argument for amnesty as a common starting point would 
therefore not be a valid argument with regards to the Colombian case. 
The aspect of amnesty in law 975 has been widely criticized, and several international and 
national organizations have expressed their concerns. Human Rights Watch states that Law 
975 neither contains effective mechanisms to achieve a genuine demobilization and 
dismantlement of paramilitary groups, nor satisfy international standards about truth, 
justice, and reparation for victims.219 Amnesty International states on its website that the 
law will guarantee impunity for human rights abusers.220
Most of the criticism of Law 975 deals with the implementation of the law, but the law text 
is also being subjected to criticism. It is possible to claim that this criticism relies on the 
supposed reasons for including the amnesty in the law, holding that the amnesty is a shield 
for state agents. As mentioned earlier, I will not speculate on this issue. Yet, this being one 
 This study, however, suggests that 
the amnesty in Law 975 to some degree is justifiable in relation to TJ perspectives. Most of 
the arguments for and against amnesty presented could be used to justify the amnesty in 
Law 975. Yet, the question is whether there is enough accountability for it to be completely 
justified. However, it is important to emphasize that this is a justification of the law text, 
and not the implementation of the law.  
                                                 
218 García-Godos and Lid (2010): p.1. 
219 Human Rights Watch (2005). 
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understanding of the public opinion is in itself an indication that the amnesty fails to 
contribute to the potential benefits of a conditional amnesty. If there is a mistrust regarding 
the amnesty amongst the public society from the beginning, the amnesty is unlikely to 
contribute to stability, peace, reconciliation, or empowerment of the victims. This can 
contribute to delegitimize the amnesty, but it does not necessarily mean that the amnesty as 
such is unjust. As I see it, this could be the case for the Colombian amnesty. And as 
stressed throughout the thesis, the reasons and methods for introducing amnesty, even if it 
is the publics’ understanding of the methods and reasons, is crucial for it to be considered 
as legitimate and just.  
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One of the main points of discussion in this study has been the supposedly contradictory 
relation between amnesty and accountability. However, this study argues that many of the 
arguments against amnesty turned out to be arguments for amnesty, and to some extent, 
vice versa. Yet, amnesty only seems justifiable from a TJ perspective if it is conditional and 
contains aspects of accountability. This observation implies that there might not be that 
great divide between amnesty and accountability as it seems in terms of fulfilling human 
rights standards, taking into account the diversity within both amnesty and accountability. 
A statement by the UN in a report on ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict 
and Post-Conflict Societies’, well describes this point: 
CONCLUSION: ”A KIND OF JUSTICE”  
Justice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing 
imperatives. Advancing all three in fragile post-conflict settings requires strategic planning, careful 
integration and sensible sequencing of activities. Approaches focusing only on one or another institution, or 
ignoring civil society or victims, will not be effective.221
Another point of interest in this study is the finding that TJ can be described as a ‘middle-
way’ between Restorative and Retributive justice, as well as a compromise between the 
two poles in the ‘peace vs. justice’ debate; criminal accountability and impunity. The study 
concludes that TJ perspectives allow for amnesty for past human rights violations to be 
justified, given that some accountability is secured through truth-seeking mechanisms, 
reparations, and vetting, and that criminal prosecutions are imposed on the perpetrators for 
the most serious crimes. So, what are then the implications of these findings?  
 
Firstly, this study might have implications for the understanding of amnesty. The title of 
Mark Freemans book ‘Necessary evils’ is one example that well describes what has been 
the view on amnesty, namely a practice that violates victims’ rights, but that still is 
necessary in certain circumstances. This study emphasizes that amnesty is not the same as 
impunity. As noted in chapter two, amnesty provides protection from liability. To what 
degree, depends on the amnesty. Maybe this study can be a contribution to a more accurate 
                                                 
221 UN Doc. S/2004/616 (2004): summary. 
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presentation of amnesty laws where the variety in content and scope is taken into account, 
and a recognition that an amnesty might also promote victims’ rights, given that it is 
drafted carefully and accompanied with TJ mechanisms.  
The findings in this study may also have implications for processes of peace negotiations 
where the classic question is how much justice is necessary in order to achieve peace. An 
understanding and recognition of the variation of amnesty laws and accountability 
measures could potentially open up for a more nuanced discussion about what kind of 
accountability would better serve the goal of both peace and justice in a political transition. 
An understanding of the fact that punishment and accountability can include other 
measures than criminal prosecutions. In this sense the understanding of TJ should also be 
more nuanced. This study implies that TJ also can serve as a mechanism of conflict 
resolution to get out of a conflict, not just to confront past human rights violations.  
Lastly; what can the implications of this study be for the Colombian case? For the sake of 
the victims, one may criticize the law for violating victims’ rights to truth, justice and 
reparations by including amnesty for the perpetrators. When choosing this topic, I initially 
thought that I would reach this conclusion. I have worked with human rights organizations 
and victims’ groups in Colombia for two years, and their work for human rights and fight 
against impunity has been one of the reasons why I wanted to look specifically at the 
Colombian case. The aspect of amnesty in Law 975 is widely criticized by many of these 
groups, but again, this critique also takes into account the implementation and the historical 
and political context. In this way this study is limited as it explores the aspect of amnesty 
only from a theoretical point of view, and further seeks to reach a conclusion whether 
amnesty is justifiable from a TJ perspective. However, the ones who should be making this 
conclusion are people that are finding themselves in these situations. In this way, an in-
depth study of the Colombian case accompanied with fieldwork would have strengthened 
the Colombia case in this study.  
However, the law text is a tool that has to be used actively by the victims in order to claim 
their rights. Having this in mind, I believe that a study focusing exclusively on the law text 
could in this way be useful. There is a point in not taking into account the political and 
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historical dimensions, as this potentially could contribute to a conclusion doming the law as 
unjustified based on the political context, rather than what is actually promised in the law.  
Writing this thesis about the justification of amnesty law, the underlying topic has been the 
very understanding of justice itself, and what kind of justice an amnesty may serve. It turns 
out that my view, based on the interpretation of the law from a TJ perspective, is that Law 
975, as well as amnesty laws in general, has the potential to secure accountability and 
justice, given that it is a conditional amnesty. They have the potential to lay the necessary 
conditions to balance peace with justice.  At least a kind of justice.  
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